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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade, attackers are compromising victim systems to launch large-scale coordinated Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks against corporate websites, banking services, e-commerce businesses etc. These attacks results in cripple down 
their services to legitimate users and cause huge financial losses. Numerous solutions have been purported to combat against 
these DDoS attacks but there is no impeccable solution to this challenging problem till date. Most of the existing solutions have 
been validated using experiments based on simulation but recently, the researchers have started using publically available real 
datasets for the validation of DDoS research. In this paper, the validation techniques used for DDoS research are investigated 
comprehensively and it is proposed to extend them with the inclusion of new validation technique of analyzing real datasets. A 
brief review of existing real datasets is presented to elucidate the trends in the validation of DDoS research.  
c 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
DDoS attacks have become a serious cause of problem and security threat for the enterprises, banks etc. doing 
businesses over the Internet. These attacks have brought enormous financial losses to them over the years. 
According to CERT1,2, “A DDoS attack is a malicious attempt from multiple systems to make computer or network 
resources unavailable to its intended users, usually by interrupting or suspending services connected to the 
Internet”. There are number of evidences reported1,3,4,5,6 which points out the severity of the DDoS problem. 
According to the survey conducted by Kaspersky lab in 20154, the average financial loss to the companies’ 
suffering from DDoS attacks is in between $52000 to $440000. According to Q1 DDoS attack report 2015 by Arbor 
networks 5, the attackers are using three main types of DDoS attacks TCP SYN flood, DNS flood and Smurf 
attacks, out of which 76% are TCP SYN flood attacks, the 90% of the attacks are application layer attacks whereas 
42% are of TCP State-Exhaustion attacks. The volume of traffic of such attacks have been amplified to around 400 
Gbps in the year 2014 as compared to 100 Gbps in the year 2010. Even the number of DDoS attacks has also 
increased exponentially over the years5. According to Security watchdog report6, the number of DDoS attacks have been 
increased by 240% in 2014. 
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Fig. 1. Validation techniques used for DDoS related research 
 
This is evident from this exponential increase in attack traffic that the attackers are continuously updating their 
skills, using advanced attack techniques to launch such huge amount of traffic and at the same time defeating the 
existing defense solutions. It has been observed that all of these DDoS attacks are launched now-a-days by using 
botnets 7. These botnets are composed of millions of compromised machines which are controlled through some 
command and control server to flood enormous amount of data towards the victim8. The major contributions of this 
paper are : 
 
x A review of validation techniques used for DDoS research.  x Addition of a new dimension of real datasets in the existing validation paradigms used for DDoS research.  x A review of publically available real datasets used for the validation of DDoS research on various 
identified attributes.  x Identification of the properties of a real datasets that would be more appropriate for the accurate validation 
of DDoS research. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section-II focuses on various validation techniques used for 
DDoS experimentation and their comparison. In section-III, a brief review of publically available real datasets on 
identified attributes is given and the last section concludes the work by highlighting the properties of an ideal 
realistic dataset that would be more appropriate for DDoS research. 
 
2. Validation Techniques used for DDoS Research 
 
Whenever a researcher proposes any novel detection or defense method in the field of network security, the pro-
posed method has to be implemented in the form of a network based experiment for its evaluation and then it needs 
to be validated through available set of validation techniques. There are basically four approaches used for 
validation in network based experiments 
9
. 
 
x Mathematical models are theoretical in nature. In such models, the given system, applications, platforms 
and conditions are modeled symbolically and then validated mathematically.  x Simulation provides a repeatable and controllable framework for network based experiments on a single 
com-puter system. A simulation based experiment is very easy to configure and manage. It gives flexibility 
to the programmers to do experiments in a rapid prototype and evaluation based environment so that many 
bad al-ternatives could be discarded timely before attempting a full implementation. Simulation use models 
of key operating system functions, kernel mechanisms, virtual platforms and synthetic conditions for 
experiments. Examples include NS2 10, NS311, OMNET++12, Qualnet3 13, OPNET 14, CORE 15 etc. 
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Table 1. Comparison of validation techniques used for DDoS Research    
 Attributes Simulation Emulation Real Systems Real Dataset  
 Fidelity Lowest Moderate Highest Highest  
 Repeatability Highest Moderate Lowest Highest  
 Programmability Highest Moderate Highest Lowest  
 Extensibility Highest Moderate Lowest Highest  
 Research Functionality Lowest Moderate Highest Highest  
 Abstraction Highest Moderate Lowest Lowest  
 Type of Network      
 Elements Virtual nodes Mixture of real and virtual nodes Real nodes Real nodes  
  x Emulation is an integration of simulation and real systems. In emulation, the real elements of an operating 
system and real applications are combined with unreal and simulated elements like soft network links, 
virtual intermediate nodes and unrealistic background traffic. However, emulation use soft routers for 
making connec-tions. The simulation runs in virtual simulated time whereas emulation runs in real time. 
Emulation technique has the concern of scalability factor as it is very di cult to extend the topology of 
computer systems beyond cer-tain limits and one can’t make topology as large as of an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) 16,17,18,19,20. Examples include: NS3 11, DETER21, Emulab 22, WAN-in-Lab (WIL) 23 etc.  x Real Systems provide realistic network conditions, real operating systems, applications and platforms and 
is proven to be best for network based experimentations. However, there are some limitations of using real 
systems for experimentations like (a) change of network topology is not possible for a new experiment b) it 
is very unsafe to do live experiments with Internet worms, viruses etc. because they can easily escape from 
the experimentation setup and can damage the live network components and (c) the flooding based DDoS 
attacks can cause degradation of network links 19 . Examples include GENI 24, PlanetLab 25 etc. 
 
Since the mathematical models are theoretical in nature, they can’t be used for such network based experiments. 
The simulation technique can’t execute real applications as it can approximate certain hardware and software 
functions only. The emulation provides a convenient way to use real hardware and applications, but its functionality 
is limited by the number of nodes, types of hardware, and di culty in configuration, management and reproducibility 
of exper-iments. The accuracy of simulation based experiments and their appropriateness for DDoS related research 
has been probed in recent times 9,26,19. Real systems are ideal for validating network based research but they are 
limited in their functionality because of their complex nature. However, GENI24, which is a real system based 
highly programmable networking testbed, has been in news recently. GENI is an attempt to interface all the existing 
popular testbeds like Emulab 22, PlanetLab 25 etc. into one integrated platform for executing real experiments at 
scale. The researchers are continuously working on solving the problems of real systems. The use of Software 
Defined Networking (SDN) 27,28 is a promising approach which makes the networks highly scalable and 
programmable.  
It has been investigated that real datasets have been used extensively for the evaluation and validation of DDoS re-
lated research recently 19,20,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37. A real dataset is a live captured data which has been generated using 
realistic network conditions which includes real operating systems, applications and platforms. Alternatively, these 
datasets can also be synthetically generated in a closed lab environment using emulation based experimentation 
setups like NS311,Emulab22, GENI 24etc. Because of their extensive use for the validation of DDoS related research, 
it is proposed to add a new dimension into the existing set of validation techniques as revealed in Figure-1. 
Mathematical models are not shown in the figure because they are not used for network based real experiments. 
Two locations are identified where the real dataset validation technique can be added (shown in figure-1) depending 
upon whether we are using existing dataset or generating our own realistic dataset through real or hybrid 
experimentation. Further, all of these validation techniques including real datasets have been compared in Table-1 
based on the generic properties of an ideal realtime network experimental setup viz: Fidelity, Repeatability, 
Programmability, Extensibility and Research Functionality 38,26,19,29. The experimental setups like NS311,Emulab22, 
GENI 24 etc. provide advanced facilities for 
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researchers to implement and evaluate DDoS detection and defense algorithms. Their generic properties are 
described briefly as follows: 
 
x Fidelity: A network based experiment setup should possess fidelity criteria which mean reliability and 
depend-ability to the real networks. The fidelity dimension includes large topology having enough number 
of nodes, real routers, heterogeneous mixture of hardware and software, and real mix of link bandwidth 
capacities and delays.  x Repeatability: A network based experiment setup should possess the facility to save and repeat or 
reproduce experiments subjected to the same environmental conditions. However, the factors like Internet 
topology, avail-able bandwidth, enhancements in software and hardware, type of background traffic and 
attack traffic makes it very di cult to repeat an experiment using real systems.  x Programmability: A network based experiment setup should have the flexibility of using new customized 
net-work mechanisms for monitoring, filtering, detecting, adding or modifying router algorithms, realistic 
hetero-geneous hardware etc. However, use of software routers may add flexibility to the programmers.  x Extensibility: A network based experiment setup should have the provision to scale the topology of 
experiments in comparison to wild Internet. Experiments should be portable and should be accessed 
remotely. 
x Research Functionality: In addition to control the hardware and software components of the experiments 
for the security based experiments, there is also need to facilitate technical and social environments for 
experiments like a wide variety of traffic and topology generators, diverse experimental profiles, latest 
tools for visualization and analysis of results etc.  x Level of Abstraction: Abstraction is the amount of complexity by which a system is viewed or 
programmed. The higher the level, the less detail and vice versa. 
x Type of Network Elements used: This parameter states the type of network elements used in the 
experiment like real nodes, soft nodes or mix of both. 
 
It has been observed from the comparison shown in the Table-1 that the simulation has lowest fidelity and research 
functionality whereas it is highest in case of real systems. The moderate values of emulation shows that it is a compromise 
between simulation and real systems. Each validation technique has its own merits and demerits. The real systems and real 
datasets are the best appropriate for validating and evaluating DDoS related research. As real systems based experiments 
are very complex and di cult to handle, the focus of researchers is shifting towards the use of publically available real 
datasets. 
 
 
3. Review of Real Datasets used for DDoS Experiments 
 
Recently, most of the DDoS related researchers have started using publically available real datasets for the 
valida-tion of their approaches 19,20,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37. However, the appropriateness of the selected dataset for the 
approach to be validated remains an open issue. According to Bhuyan et. al. 39, it is very crucial to select a suitable 
dataset for the validation of any proposed DDoS attack detection technique. The captured network trace should 
contain the mixture of realistic background traffic and attack traffic in appropriate proportion, and should not be 
biased towards specific type of traffic37. However, it is very di cult to ensure appropriate mixture of normal and 
attack traffic in a real experiment driven dataset because there is no known formula to model Internet traffic 
correctly55.  
There are number of real datasets which are publically available and have been used extensively for the DDoS 
related research. These real datasets are summarized below: 
 
x FIFA World Cup Dataset 1998: This dataset records the requests sent to the football world Cup’s website 
during the time period April - July 1998. Overall 1,352,804,107 requests were received by the website.  
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The stored log files were originally in the Common Log Forma but to ensure the privacy of each individual 
that visited the website, the client IP addresses are pseudonymised and replaced with a unique identifier 48. x T Lincoln Laboratory LLSDDoS Dataset 1998: This laboratory is the store house of tcpdump network traces data th t has been captured in realtime. For examp e, LLDOS 1.0 da as t records a DDoS attack runby an inexperienced atta ker whereas LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset ec rds a DDoS atta k launch by a s ealthierattacker. Th  
 
x MIT Lincoln Laboratory LLSDDoS Dataset 1998: This laboratory is the store house of tcpdump 
network traces data that has been captured in realtime. For example, LLDOS 1.0 dataset records a DDoS 
attack run by an inexperienced attacker whereas LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset records a DDoS attack launch by a 
stealthier attacker. The data of all 5 attack phases of a DDoS attack has been recorded in which the attacker 
firstly do network scanning in initial phase and then compromise the hosts by exploiting the sadmind 
vulnerability of solaris Operating system. Then it downloads the mstream DDoS software which is a trojan 
based malicious program and launch the DDoS attack 
40
.  x KDD cup Dataset 1999 : The KDD Cup 1999 dataset was generated for the 3rd International Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition( KDD99). This dataset is extensively used for malware 
related research. But its scope of usage is very limited. Mainly it is used for the evaluation of signature 
based IDS’s only. It is not appropriate for evaluating DDoS detection, Flash Events and DDoS defense 
methods41. 
x UCLA Dataset 2001: This dataset contains packet traces collected during August 2001 by Network 
research lab. It contains records of UDP flood traffic having 1001B long packets. The attack is aborted at 
the end of the trace and proceeds with legitimate connections42. 
x CAIDA DDoS Attack Dataset 2007: This dataset contains the traffic traces of a flooding DDoS attack for 
the period of around one hour. The aim of attack was to consume the computing resource of the targeted 
server. However, IP addresses are pseudonymised, their payloads and non-attack traffic has been removed 
from the dataset for security reasons which limits the usability of this dataset. This dataset found its 
application in detecting low rate stealthy as well as high rate flooding DDoS attacks 43. 
x Waikato Internet Trace Storage Project Dataset 2009: This is another widely referenced dataset for 
DDoS related research[1]. In this dataset, IP addresses are not actual and has been modified , the headers of 
transport layer and payload of UDP packets are removed for security reasons 44. 
x DARPA DDoS attack dataset 2009: This is the latest DDoS attack based dataset from MIT Lincoln 
laboratory. The captured traffic contains a SYN flood DDoS attack on one target and background traffic. 
The DDoS traffic comes from about 100 di erent IPs. These hosts were used to launch a malware DDoS 
attack on a non-local target 45. 
x TUIDS DDoS Dataset 2012: this dataset was prepared using TUIDS testbed archietecture with a 
Demilitarized zone (DMZ), consists of traffic from 5 di erent networks inside Tezpur University Campus. 
The attackers are placed in both wired and wireless networks with reflectors and the target placed inside the 
internal network. This dataset has also find its application in detecting low rate stealthy as well as high rate 
flooding DDoS attacks 46. 
x Booter DNS Dataset 2014: This dataset is used to detect DNS based reflection and amplification DDoS 
attacks. This dataset is the record of DNSSEC-signed domains which includes traffic from around 70% of 
all active domains 47. 
 
Today, the major thrust area in the field of DDoS is to distinguish attack traffic from similar looking Flash Events 
(FE) traffic 37. FE traffic occurs when a server experiences an unexpected increase in requests from the legitimate 
clients. The Flash Events (FEs) have some common characteristics with DDoS attacks such as a substantial increase 
in the incoming network traffic, the overloading of the servers providing the services, and a degradation in the 
delivery of service 49. It has been observed from the comparison as shown in Table 2 that there are only two datasets 
available for detecting FE traffic which are quite obsolete as there is enormous change in behavior of traffic, users 
and Internet services over the years and the same datasets can’t be used as benchmark for validating present-day 
detection method-ologies. In DDoS research, only CAIDA 31,37,50,51,49,52, DARPA 53,51 and TUIDS 31 datasets are 
extensively used, the other datasets MIT Lincoln’s LLSDOS 1.0 and 2.032,50, UCLA 49 and Waikato 44 are used 
rarely because they are quite obsolete as cleared from their year of generation. In KDD Cup 1999 dataset, it is very 
di cult to discriminate the attack traffic from the background traffic as the dataset is not properly labeled. TUIDS  
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dataset is recently been gaining popularity in the field of DDoS research but is synthetically generated. Booter DNS 
dataset is the latest addition in this list but it contains DNS queries traffic only. 
 
There are number of limitations of these publically available datesets which limits their usage for validating 
DDoS research. 
 
x the presence of asymmetric traffic.  x short length of the captured network traces.  x pseudonymised IP addresses that makes the understanding of traffic context very difficult.  x the model of legitimate user’s behavior till date is not known, and hence not properly 
captured. 
x  low rate stealthy attacks that are di cult to detect, are not captured. 
x most of the available datasets capture network layer traffic, hiding the application specific 
details.  
x FE datasets are obsolete.  x failure of existing DDoS detection and defense approaches as attackers are moving from high volume, 
easily noticed attacks to low volume stealthy attacks. 
 
It is evident from these limitations that these publically available datasets lacks key characteristics of the network 
traffic and thus are not appropriate for the validation of DDoS research. For the evaluation of any DDoS attack 
detection method, the availability of such realistic traffic dataset that possess mixture of appropriate attack traffic, 
non-attack traffic and normal background traffic, is the need of the hour. An ideal realistic dataset must possess the 
following properties. 
 
x Real source and destination IP addresses. In order to simulate real time traffic scenarios, it is required 
that the clients must make valid TCP connections with the target server and accesses real pages on the 
server, which is possible only when both the client and server IP addresses are real. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of publicly available real DDoS datasets     
 Year Dataset Dataset Dataset Traffic Traffic IP Address 
   Category Scope Type capturing  
      Layer  
 1998 FIFA World Cup 
48
 Real Flash HTTP Application Mapped 
 1998, MIT  Lincoln  Laboratory Synthetic DDoS TCP Transport Actual 
 1999, LLSDDoS 1.0 and LLSD-      
 2000 DoS 2.0.1 40      
 1999 KDD Cup 41 Real Flash, TCP Transport Mapped 
    DDoS    
 2001 UCLA 
42
 Synthetic DDoS UDP Transport Mapped 
 2007 CAIDA
43
 Real DDoS ICMP Network Mapped 
 2009 Waikato Internet Trace Stor- Synthetic DDoS UDP Transport Actual 
  age Project44      
 2009 DARPA  2009  DDoS  At- Synthetic DDoS TCP Transport Actual 
  tack 45      
 2012 TUIDS 46 Synthetic DDoS ICMP, Network, Actual 
     UDP, TCP Transport  
 2014 Booter 
47
 Real DDoS DNS Application Actual 
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x A wide range of random source IP addresses. The network traffic initiating from a wide range of IP 
addresses forms the key characteristic of the network dataset. It is required that actual attacks and FE traffic 
should be generated making use of a wide range of IP addresses.  x Actual packets with valid headers. To ensure the realistic nature of the traffic generated and captured , it 
is desirable that packets must have valid headers. 
x Appropriate mixture of normal and attack traffic. To effectively evaluate any DDoS attack technique, 
the network traffic has to be generated with a appropriate mixture of normal legitimate and malicious 
attack traffic. 
 
The properties of real datasets mentioned above are idealistic and are very di cult to achieve by real systems 
experimentation alone. Real systems suffer from a number of problems as mentioned earlier. They need to be 
augmented with emulation based techniques for better results as done by Fico et. al 54. More reasonable results in 
DDoS research can also be obtained if the operational data from known networks become available for research 
purpose. A few researchers have performed real experiments in recent times 20,37,56. Calvet et. al. 20 observe the 
behavior of Waledac botnet in a real time environment and access the performance of mitigation scheme against its 
P2P infrastructure. Sajal et.al. 37 developed a realtime traffic generation testbed framework for synthetically 
generating di erent types of realistic DDoS attacks, FEs and other benign traffic traces. Spognradi et. al.56 did the 
analysis of real netflow datasets captured in the ExTrABIRE project of Italy for large scale traffic anomaly 
detection. Yuan et.al. 
53
 supervise the network traffic on the edge routers of local area network and measure the 
flow entropy metric to detect traffic anomalies. On the similar grounds, focusing on realtime experiment setups to 
enable the validation of DDoS research against real traffic at large scale, is the need of the hour. The researcher 
community should now change their focus from traditional simulation based experiments and analyzing publically 
available obsolete datasets to real scalable experiments. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Many solutions have been proposed to detect, prevent or mitigate DDoS attacks in literature. Most of these 
solutions have been validated using experiments based on simulation, emulation, real systems and analysis of 
publically available real datasets. Each of these validation techniques has their own merits and demerits but recently, 
real datasets are extensively used as an alternative to existing validation techniques of DDoS related research. It has 
been observed from the comparison of various publically available real datasets that there is no appropriate dataset 
avail-able for validating the DDoS research. Most of the available real datasets are obsolete, some of them lack 
required characteristics of network traffic and most of the above real datasets are not make available to the research 
community for security reasons. So, it is concluded that the trend of DDoS research is shifting towards scalable real 
experiments and there is need to generate realistic datasets. Our future work is to develop such a scalable real 
testbed for the generation of realistic datasets. It would surely be going to help the research community to develop 
more accurate detection and defense mechanisms to tackle the ever growing threat of DDoS attacks. 
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